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THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY has a rich history of regula-tion, deregulation, competition, labor disputes, and sol-
vency problems.1 Airlines play an irreplaceable role in American
society. The industry is responsible for over $1.5 trillion in U.S.
economic activity annually, 10 million American jobs, and trans-
portation of 2 million passengers each day.2 More than 5% of
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law May 2019; BBA Finance, The
University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business 2013. Thank you to
my parents, Kirk and Theresa Hiland; my in-laws, Joe and Laura Edwards; and my
beautiful wife, Sara. I will always be grateful for your love and support.
1 See Athanassios Papaioannou, The Duty to Bargain and Rejection of Collective
Agreements Under Section 1113 by a Bankrupt Airline: Trying to Reconcile R.L.A. with the
Bankruptcy Code, 18 TRANSP. L.J. 219, 219–20 (1990).
2 The Airline Industry, AIRLINES.ORG, http://airlines.org/industry/#safety
[https://perma.cc/5MGF-8Y5R].
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the United States’ gross domestic product is attributable to com-
mercial aviation alone.3 It is unsurprising, given its impact, that
the industry has been subject to a fluctuating regulatory and leg-
islative environment since the first U.S. commercial flight in
1914.4 What is more interesting, at least to interested observers,
is the unique history and interconnection of regulatory changes,
competition, legislation, unionization, and bankruptcy in the
industry.
This Comment will explore the history of the American air-
line industry, the related regulatory environment, labor rela-
tions, and insolvency challenges. Section II will discuss the
current state of airline regulations, labor relations law, and the
application of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code). Specifically, it
will explain the strategy of using the Code as a means for strug-
gling airlines to gain the upper hand in labor disputes. Next,
Section III will address some previously proposed alternatives to
the current bankruptcy strategy for resolving difficult collective
bargaining issues and ultimately find them lacking. Finally, Sec-
tion IV will propose a radical new legislative solution for resolv-
ing labor disputes without resorting to bankruptcy protection.
I. HISTORY OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, LABOR
RELATIONS, AND INSOLVENCY
A. THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY BUILDUP
The commercial airline industry has changed drastically since
a Benoist XIV flew one passenger over twenty-one miles of water
to Tampa.5 That first flight garnered over 3,000 spectators to
watch takeoff.6 Fast forward about 100 years: over three billion
people flew in 2013.7 This drastic change did not occur without
overcoming significant obstacles.
3 Data & Statistics, AIRLINES.ORG, http://airlines.org/data/ [https://perma
.cc/ZB9L-YC54].
4 The First Commercial Flight, FIRSTFLIGHTCENTENNIAL.ORG, http://www.first-
flightcentennial.org/the-first-commercial-flight/ [https://perma.cc/Z6J2-VVK3].
5 If you think plane tickets are expensive now, take notice of the $400 ($5,000
in today’s money) auction price for the first flight. See id.; Mark Johanson, How
The Airline Industry Has Evolved Over 100 Years Of Commercial Air Travel, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2014 at 6:50 AM), www.ibtimes.com/how-airline-industry-has-
evolved-100-years-commercial-air-travel-1524238 [https://perma.cc/FQP5-
JUTK].
6 Johanson, supra note 5.
7 Id.
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One of the first obstacles to commercial air transportation was
a dispute over the ownership of the air. Prior to World War I,
discussions of a state’s authority over the airspace seemed unim-
portant.8 After wartime use demonstrated the importance and
benefits of aviation as a means of transporting both goods and
people, the parties to the Paris Peace Conference chose to hold
the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation9
to address international aviation concerns.10 The convention
was responsible for the International Commission for Air Navi-
gation, one of the first international aviation regulatory bod-
ies.11 Although not applicable to the United States,12 two
important precedents were set. First, the air was no longer con-
sidered “free” but was instead subject to the authority of the na-
tion lying under it. Second, international aviation activities were
now regulated, which set the tone for future governance of the
skies.13
In the United States, it did not take long for Congress to be-
gin dabbling in aviation-focused legislation. The Air Mail Act of
1925 authorized the Postmaster General to contract with private
carriers to transport mail and regulated the rates that could be
charged for different air mail services.14 In 1930, the Air Mail
Act was amended by the McNary-Watres Act.15 This amendment
gave further powers to the Postmaster General, changed the
contract bidding system, and altered the way mail contracts were
paid,16 resulting in increased incentives for carriers to haul pas-
8 James Patrick Baldwin, Aviation Regulation – History and Practice, JPB TRANSP.,
at Part One (Dec. 1, 2015), https://jpbtransconsulting.com/tag/paris-conven
tion-of-1919/ [https://perma.cc/49MU-7K69].
9 See International Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation,
Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.T.N.S. 174 (no longer in effect).
10 Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part One.
11 Id.
12 The United States failed to ratify and join the League of Nations and conse-
quently was not a party to the convention. Id.
13 See id.
14 Air Mail Act of 1925, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805 (1925) [hereinafter the Kelly Act].
15 Act of April 29, 1930, ch. 223, § 3, 46 Stat. 259 (1930) [hereinafter the Mc-
Nary-Watres Act].
16 The legislation gave the Postmaster General the following abilities:
(1) to pay the carriers on the basis of miles flown with mail or with
specified space reserved for mail, thus for the first time relating air
mail pay to service costs rather than revenues; (2) to increase (as
well as to decrease) the original contract rates of compensation,
under the route certificates, subject to specified limitations; (3) to
make extensions or consolidations of routes without competitive
bidding—a provision intended to authorize contracts for the de-
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sengers along with the mail.17 The new law also allowed Walter
Brown, the Postmaster General, to consolidate airmail routes to
three companies,18 a foreshadowing anti-competitive result that
would be repeated over the next several decades.
Mail-related laws were not the only regulatory measures im-
plemented during this period. The first regulation of aircraft
and carrier employees was the Air Commerce Act of 1926,19
which touched on issues such as aircraft registration, altitude
separation during flights, aircraft inspections, and minimum
mental and physical standards for pilots to fly commercially.20
Congress followed up by creating the Aeronautics Branch of the
Department of Commerce, which was responsible for issuing
Civil Air Regulations, and the Federal Aviation Commission to
study regulations and recommend policies.21 This evolving pro-
cess led to the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193822 and the creation
of the Civil Aeronautics Authority.23 This new agency controlled
all civilian aviation regulations for the federal government, in-
cluding fares and routes, until it was split into two agencies in
1940.24 The air transport industry struggled throughout this pe-
riod, in part due to the “most varied and constantly changing
regulation by Government ever accorded in so short a time to
an industry.”25
As World War II came to a close, the Chicago Convention of
1944 ushered in an era of international and bilateral26 aviation
agreements.27 The International Air Transport Association was
serving passenger carriers without mail contracts, by way of sublet-
ting to them extensions of existing mail routes; (4) to consider,
when issuing regulations along with route certificates, the need for
“adjusting mail operations to the advances in the art of flying and
passenger transportation”—the last three words being added by the
new Act.
Frederick A. Ballard, Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1235, 1245
(1947) (emphasis in original).
17 Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part One.
18 Id.
19 Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) (repealed by Federal
Aviation Act of 1958).
20 Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Two.
21 Id.
22 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
23 Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Two.
24 The new agency was called the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Id.
25 Ballard, supra note 16, at 1242.
26 For example, the United States and Britain signed the Bermuda Air Agree-
ment in 1946. Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Three.
27 Id.
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formed in 1945 to create a non-governmental organization dedi-
cated to promoting economical and safe air transportation
amongst member carriers.28
After several mid-air collisions, it became apparent that the
Airway Modernization Act of 1957,29 passed in part to update air
traffic control facilities, had been insufficient to prevent aviation
accidents.30 As a result, the Federal Aviation Act of 195831 was
passed as a repeal of previous air commerce laws32 and a com-
prehensive approach to the federal government’s role in regu-
lating air travel.33 The Federal Aviation Act created the Federal
Aviation Agency (FAA)34 and sparked a twenty-year period of
“strict economic regulation in the United States and govern-
ment protectionism in the rest of the world.”35
The first several decades of the airline industry’s history were
burdened with wide-reaching, inconsistent, and constantly
changing legislative and regulatory action. This is unsurprising
given how important the industry is to America’s economy, soci-
ety, and national security. While air travel had grown drastically
over this period, after decades of protectionism and trying to
find the right way to regulate the skies in America, politicians
decided it was time for a radical new approach to governing
aviation.
B. THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION
The economics of the early airline industry depended heavily
on the rates and routes set by government agencies.36 The
growth of the industry, new technology, and the introduction of
new planes made this regulated arrangement untenable.37 The
introduction of larger aircrafts like the Boeing 747,38 which
28 Id.
29 Airways Modernization Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-133, 71 Stat. 349 (1957).
30 Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Four.
31 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 101).
32 The Air Commerce Act of 1926, Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and Airways
Modernization Act of 1957 were all repealed by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
33 Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Four.
34 Federal Aviation Act § 301(a); 49 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2018).
35 Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Four.
36 See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (and accompa-
nying text); Air Mail Act of 1925, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805 (1925) (and accompanying
text).
37 Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Five.
38 Other significant aircrafts included the Lockheed L-1011 and the McDon-
nell Douglas DC-10. Id.
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could carry significantly more passengers, made the Civil Aero-
nautics Board’s regulatory role, specifically in setting prices, far
more difficult.39 Regulations made it harder for carriers to fill
the seats, and “pricing policies were viewed as insufficient, re-
sulting in high costs for the passenger.”40 These issues were ex-
acerbated41 by the 1970 recession and 1973 Arab oil embargo.42
The government’s response to these systemic problems came
in the form of a radical new approach to governing the airline
industry: governing it less. When the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 (ADA)43 was passed, the goal was to create more competi-
tion in the airline industry as a replacement for the former de-
pendency on federal agencies.44 Specifically, the act was
intended to “encourage, develop, and attain an air transporta-
tion system which relies on competitive market forces to deter-
mine the quality, variety, and price of air services[.]”45 To the
extent that airlines could not compete with each other and
make their own decisions to operate efficiently, the ADA was
effective. “For the first time in its history, the airline industry
resemble[d] a truly competitive industry. Airlines [were] now
free to set their own fares—up to 5% above or down to 50%
below the standard industry fare level (SIFL)—without ob-
taining Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) approval.”46 Rather than
rely on government agencies, the industry made business deci-
sions about which routes to service and how to discount rates to
fill seats based on their own discretion.47
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 The 1973 oil embargo hit airlines especially hard because fuel costs are one
of the industry’s largest expenses. See The Industry Handbook: The Airline Industry,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/features/industryhandbook/air
line.asp [https://perma.cc/8SX3-7S2B].
42 Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Five.
43 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1301) [hereinafter Airline Deregulation
Act].
44 Stephen E. Creager, Airline Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J.
319, 320 (1983); Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Five.
45 Airline Deregulation Act, pmbl.
46 Beth S. Adler, Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Industry: Toward a New
Judicial Interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 1003, 1003 (1986)
(alterations to the quotation made to represent the quote as a contemporaneous
look back at the ADA’s impact, whereas the article itself was written only a few
years after its passage).
47 Id.
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By 1985, as a result of this reduced regulatory control, the
Civil Aeronautics Board was disbanded.48 Since then, the United
States has signed Open Skies agreements, which promote simi-
lar free market competition principles in the international avia-
tion market, with 112 countries.49 After more than fifty years of
economic regulation, America had set the tone for the world in
economic deregulation. Although economic deregulation
seemed a logical solution to the problems posed by a highly reg-
ulated industry, it did not come without a cost. The ADA pro-
vided the industry with more freedom to operate, but the cost of
more freedom, as is discussed below, is the possibility of failure.
C. LABOR BEFORE DEREGULATION
Labor unions have played a significant role in American his-
tory. The earliest recorded strike was in 1768, when tailors pro-
tested wage reductions.50 As of 2015, the union membership
rate was 11.1%, and the total number of union members in the
United States was 14.8 million.51 While overall union member-
ship in the United States has dropped in recent years,52 unions
still play a critical role in several fields, including the airline in-
dustry.53 Given their prominence and relative power in the in-
dustry, it is unsurprising that unions are often involved in strife
and disputes with the carriers that employ their members.54 Un-
derstanding the history of unions generally, and specifically in
relation to the airline industry, will illustrate more clearly the
legal issues addressed in this article and why the proposed solu-
tion would be beneficial.
Since the aviation industry’s infancy, the federal government
has struggled to find the right way to govern and regulate air-
48 Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Five.
49 Id.
50 Labor Movement, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/labor
[https://perma.cc/P38J-MCBK].
51 A Brief History of Unions, UNION PLUS, https://www.unionplus.org/page/
brief-history-unions. [https://perma.cc/EB8K-9EMD].
52 The 2009 union membership rate was 12%, which declined to 11.1% in just
six years. Id.; Labor Movement, supra note 50.
53 See generally Barry Hirsch, Unions and Wages in the Airline Industry, INT’L AIR
TRANSP. ASS’N (July 2007), https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/eco-
nomics/Hirsch_Unions_Wages.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4UD-GEVR].
54 “It’s a familiar bout for much of American industry—management and la-
bor locked in strained negotiations amidst a weakened economy and softened
bottom line . . . .” Unions Threaten to Ground The Airline Industry, HUMAN EVENTS
(May 25, 2012 at 11:56 AM), http://humanevents.com/2012/05/25/unions-
threaten-to-ground-the-airline-industry/ [https://perma.cc/98XH-TUN3].
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lines.55 Regulating the industry’s relationship with labor, how-
ever, was a seemingly less tumultuous task. The Railway Labor
Act (RLA),56 originally passed in 1926 solely to regulate the rail-
road industry,57 has governed the relations between air carriers
and labor unions since its 1936 amendment.58 While the indus-
try overall has changed drastically since 1936, the RLA, even
with its amendments, has remained substantially the same.59
The United States had been progressively moving toward
more labor-friendly policies for years. The Clayton Act,60 passed
in 1914, was written in part to clarify that anti-monopoly policies
in the Sherman Antitrust Act of 189061 do not apply to trade
unions.62 Likewise, the RLA was passed in response to a series of
failed attempts to address labor issues in the railroad industry.
The Transportation Act of 192063 created the Railway Labor
Board, originally thought to be another step towards labor-
friendly policies. Although this board was intended to settle la-
bor disputes through proposed resolutions,64 it was an evident
failure just two years later. After the Railway Labor Board pro-
posed a 12% wage cut for railroad workers, unions began to
strike in 1922.65 The workers, rail carriers,66 and public lost con-
fidence in the then-current system to keep the railroads running
55 See supra Part I.A.
56 Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (now codified as amended at
45 U.S.C. § 151).
57 Lisa Catherine Tulk, Comment, The 1926 Railway Labor Act and the Modern
American Airline Industry: Changes and “Chaos” Outline the need for Revised Legislation,
69 J. AIR L. & COM. 615, 616–17 (2004).
58 Railway Labor Act, amendments, ch. 166, 49 Stat. 1189 (1936) (amended to
apply the Railway Labor Act to air carriers).
59 Tulk, supra note 57, at 615.
60 Clayton Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 731 (now codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29
U.S.C. §§ 52–53).
61 The law’s policy outlawing monopolizing activities was interpreted to apply
to labor organizing. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647 § 2, 26 Stat. 209
(1890).
62 As a reward for significant union support in the 1912 election, Woodrow
Wilson pledged his support for workers’ rights and even addressed the Teamsters
Convention in 1914. Signing the Clayton Act into law was another “tip of the hat”
to the Wilson-friendly unions. 1914: The Clayton Act, TEAMSTERS (Apr. 22, 2015),
https://teamster.org/news/2015/04/1914-clayton-act. [https://perma.cc/RS4S-
DPPH].
63 Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-162, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
64 Id. §§ 301–308.
65 Stephen Millies, The Great Railroad Strike of 1922, WORKERS WORLD (Feb. 27,
2014), https://www.workers.org/2014/02/27/great-railroad-strike-1922/
[https://perma.cc/4TB6-L38K].
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safely and on schedule.67 The strike was quashed by the Harding
administration, but unions had won a major victory by ushering
in the RLA as a response.68
Ten years after the RLA began managing railroad labor rela-
tions, the United States chose to expand the act’s reach to cover
the airline industry. In 1936, a pilot’s union, seeking to receive
protections similar to those of their peers in other industries,
urged Congress to pass labor protections for the airlines.69 Al-
though the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) had been im-
plemented in 1935,70 Congress chose to extend the RLA to
cover the relatively small, but growing, airline industry.71 As dis-
cussed more extensively below, the RLA appeared more fitting
than the NLRA, in part because of the RLA’s specific dispute
resolution procedures; this decision would greatly alter labor’s
effect on the airline industry.72
While airline employees began to unionize and collectively
bargain under the RLA, the overall industry was adjusting to reg-
ulation under the Civil Aeronautics Act.73 As discussed above,
the regulatory scheme for the airline industry changed fre-
quently.74 Despite this, the RLA remained functionally stable for
several decades. Though this seems counterintuitive, it makes
more sense when considering it in light of the competing inter-
ests at play in labor disputes and how those interests are im-
pacted by the general industry regulatory program. The primary
regulatory component in every scheme implemented was that
airlines did not have full freedom to set their own fares, rates, or
routes serviced.75 With revenues generally controlled by a gov-
ernment agency, air carriers did not need to compete on an effi-
66 Without any anti-strike laws, rail carriers saw the RLA as a “way to peaceably
settle labor disputes” and ensure “smooth operation of the transportation indus-
try.” Tulk, supra note 57, at 617.
67 “With skilled machinist striking, seventy-one percent of locomotives failed
monthly inspections from August through September 1922.” Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
71 Tulk, supra note 57, at 617.
72 The NLRA, rather than prescribing specific procedures, “focused more on
workers’ rights to unionize, not how a union interacts with an employer or the
relationship between a company and its employees.” Id. at 617–18.
73 See Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Two; supra Part I.A.
74 See supra Part I.A.
75 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958);
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938); Air Mail Act of 1925,
ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805 (1925); see generally supra Part I.A.
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ciency basis.76 Airlines instead competed on less fiscally relevant
items such as service because “most airlines were pretty much
guaranteed a profit.”77 As such, labor costs were less of a con-
cern to air carriers who knew that their competition would not
be able to undercut prices and put downward pressure on reve-
nues. Airlines did not need to cut wages and benefits or push
employees to work longer hours but could instead depend on
industry wide revenue regulation to keep them profitable.78
The results of this system were generally positive for labor un-
ions and their members. For example, when air carriers wanted
to merge or transfer routes amongst each other, they would
need approval from the CAB.79 As a condition for approval, the
CAB would regularly require the carriers to adopt Labor Protec-
tion Provisions (LPPs).80 LPPs originated in the railroad indus-
try but were expanded by the CAB to cover additional benefits
in the airline industry.81 Membership in various unions began to
grow during this labor-friendly period, and during World War
II, union membership was often associated with patriotism.82
Though the period between 1936 and 1978 produced gener-
ally “stable and increasing wages, secure employment[,] and
good working conditions[,]” the gains did not always come eas-
ily.83 Contract negotiations in 1948 between American Airlines
and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), for example, were
76 Tulk, supra note 57, at 628–29.
77 For an interesting example of this, look up the colorful, lavish, and exten-
sive menus provided on flights. Though it seems ridiculous to change carriers for
something like this today, until the Airline Deregulation Act amenities and ser-
vices like this were the primary points of competition. See Benet Wilson,
#FlashbackFriday 20 Airline Menus from the 1960s and 1970s, TRIPSAVVY (July 28,
2017), https://www.tripsavvy.com/vintage-airline-menus-3860679 [https://per
ma.cc/CZ4A-2KJ3].
78 See Tulk, supra note 57, at 628–29.
79 Laurie Schoder, Note, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: The Effect of Airline Deregula-
tion on Labor Relations, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 105, 114–15 (1994).
80 Id.
81 Additional new benefits included “seniority integration, supplemental pay to
employees forced into lower paying jobs, dismissal allowances, retention of fringe
benefits for dismissed employees, payment of moving expenses, and binding arbi-
tration of disputes between the airline and the employees about these provi-
sions.” Id.
82 “Patriotically, the maximum flying hour limitation was increased from 85 to
100. The number of ALPA [Air Line Pilots Association] members increased from
1,400 in 1940 to 5,730 at the end of World War II. 90% of all airline pilots were
members.” The Beginning, ALLIED PILOTS ASS’N, https://www.alliedpilots.org/
AboutUs/The-Beginning [https://perma.cc/F5S4-UZNF].
83 Tulk, supra note 57, at 628–29.
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particularly difficult. The process, discussed in more detail be-
low, required five months of unsuccessful negotiation followed
by mediation, as provided in the RLA, before it resulted in im-
proved working conditions and pay increases for some copi-
lots.84 When the contract became amendable the next year, it
took more than two years to reach an agreement. The ALPA had
“direct negotiations, mediation, arbitration rejected by [Ameri-
can Airlines], strike date set, and a Presidential Emergency
Board appointed by President Truman on January 13, 1951.”85
Again, the long process lead to improvements in working condi-
tions, including “maximum duty times” and “minimum off-duty
breaks,” and raises for both captains and copilots .86 Though it
required fourteen months, the 1955 ALPA negotiations resulted
in, among other things, better retirement benefits for pilots.87 A
few years later, American Airlines pilots went on strike for
twenty-two days to gain significant pay raises and changes to the
maximum flight hours system.88 Prior to the ADA, the RLA
seemingly always produced contractual concessions on behalf of
the airlines. In fact, analysis of wage differentials from before
and after deregulation show that “airline workers received about
a ten percent wage premium under regulation.”89
However, regulation of the industry was not the only reason
that unions often won labor disputes. In many ways, the proce-
dures prescribed by the RLA, and the fundamental importance
of air transportation in American society, put unions in a strong
bargaining position.90 Perhaps the best example is the 1966 In-
ternational Association of Machinists (IAM) strike.91 As profits
grew for the industry, especially based on new jet technology,
IAM members became upset after several years of stagnant
wages.92 After a year of negotiations and the expiration of the
84 The Beginning, supra note 82.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 The new benefits included the addition of a variable fund to the company
retirement plan. Id.
88 Id.
89 David Card, Deregulation and Labor Earnings in the Airline Industry 35 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5687, 1996), http://www.nber
.org/papers/w5687 [https://perma.cc/J6ER-D8W7].
90 RLA structure is discussed in detail in Part II, infra.
91 Today in Labor History: Airline Workers Strike in 1966, PEOPLE’S WORLD (July 8,
2015, 11:28 AM), http://www.peoplesworld.org/article/today-in-labor-history-air-
line-workers-strike-in-196/ [https://perma.cc/6XN7-9KKW].
92 Id.
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IAM contract with five major carriers, the IAM members pick-
eted 230 airports nationwide.93 When the CAB allowed other
carriers to expand service, the Transport Workers Union an-
nounced that they would not perform any additional work on
planes or routes resulting from for the strike.94 Emergency ne-
gotiations at the White House, called for by President Lyndon B.
Johnson, lasted twenty-two days and resulted in a settled 4.5%
annual raise for three years.95 When IAM members voted to re-
ject this settlement, late night mediation conducted by then-As-
sistant Secretary of Labor Jim Reynolds finally resulted in a 6%
pay raise.96
The ability to strong-arm carriers combined with the comfort
of government-regulated revenue allowed for significant and
consistent gains for unionized airline employees before the en-
actment of the ADA. Given the forty years of labor success in a
regulated industry, it is no surprise that unions “vehemently op-
posed the passage” of the ADA.97
D. LABOR AFTER DEREGULATION
While the ADA did not immediately erase labor gains under
the RLA, it did fundamentally alter the priorities and bargaining
positions of the parties. Unions opposed the ADA out of a
blameless self-interest: unions feared the potential for an oligop-
oly in the industry caused by “unbridled competition, price
slashing, and unemployment[.]”98 These fears proved to be well-
founded in the short term and continue to be a concern more
than thirty-five years later.
Airlines were suddenly able to compete based on price and
efficiency. New airlines formed, which stretched the market
among more carriers and amplified the importance of increased
competition.99 Air carriers could no longer rely on luxurious




96 The fact that the President’s original guidance was a 3.2% raise, the original
settlement was a 4.5% raise, and the negotiations ended with an even greater
wage increase, indicates the strong hold that unions had over the industry. Id.
97 Jonni Walls, Comment, Airline Mergers, Acquisitions and Bankruptcies: Will the
Collective Bargaining Agreement Survive?, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 847, 852 (1991).
98 Id.
99 Tulk, supra note 57, at 629.
100 Rather than luxurious menus, passengers are now fortunate to get a pack-
age of Biscoff cookies. See Wilson, supra note 77.
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ing put immense pressure on the previously guaranteed reve-
nues.101 To maintain their bottom lines, air carriers began
focusing more on limiting operating costs and expenses, result-
ing in rising unemployment.102 Because airline employees were
so well-paid, they became an immediate target for cost cut-
ting.103 Between 1980 and 1990, earnings declined approxi-
mately 10% for airline employees in all fields.104
These new factors in the industry were exacerbated by overall
economic recession and rising energy prices.105 Immediately af-
ter deregulation, the cost of fuel tripled.106 Airlines scrambled to
cut fuel costs through capital expenditures, investing heavily in
new planes and technology.107 These investments, however, re-
quired taking on large debts.108 Managing new interest expenses
and the heightened risk of insolvency that accompanies highly
leveraged firms were often more important to carriers than ac-
commodating the wishes of an expensive labor force.109
Apart from the wage depression effects, deregulation had a
significant impact on other labor issues. One of the major gains
for unions during the era of regulations was the limitation on
the hours worked per month.110 Though FAA regulations
capped pilot hours, for example, at eighty-five hours per month,
collective bargaining agreements made under the RLA often set
lower limits.111 In the ten years after deregulation, pilots began
reporting an average of 41.8 hours per week, up thirteen per-
cent from 1979.112 Other airline employees experienced a simi-
lar rise, which served to somewhat offset gains made prior to
deregulation.113
101 See Tulk, supra note 57, at 629.
102 Id.
103 Card, supra note 89.
104 “Microdata from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses show a ten percent decline in
the relative earnings of airline workers after deregulation, with roughly similar
declines for industry-specific occupations (pilots and flight attendants) and gen-
eral occupations (managers and secretaries).” Card, supra note 89, at Abstract.
105 See Baldwin, supra note 8, at Part Five.
106 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway Labor
Act in the Era of Deregulation, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1489–90.
107 Id.
108 Many of these capital expenditures included larger planes and jets that
were capable of carrying more passengers while minimizing overall fuel usage. Id.
109 Id.
110 See The Beginning, supra note 82.
111 Card, supra note 89, at 19.
112 Id. at 20.
113 Id.
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The desire to maintain profitability was not the only cause of
labor woes after the ADA. The CAB was disbanded a few years
after deregulation,114 and its remaining authority was adopted
by other federal agencies with less labor-friendly policies.115
Under the new system, LPPs were left to the collective bargain-
ing process rather than imposed as a merger condition.116 As a
result, employees not represented by the acquiring carrier’s cer-
tified union were often left unprotected by a labor system
that only obligates carriers to negotiate with certified
representatives.117
Negotiating itself has become more difficult as well. With
more at stake and less wiggle room in the carrier’s budget, col-
lective bargaining contracts now take longer to finalize. Between
1978 and 1989, the median contract negotiation took nine
months.118 As time progressed, the number of contracts in place
before the amendable date slowly declined.119 “[T]he number
of contracts that required more than 24 months to negotiate
more than doubled” between 1990–2002, relative to
1978–1989.120 To make matters worse, evidence indicates that
negotiating in the era of deregulation is made even more chal-
lenging and lengthy “if the economic conditions facing the bar-
gaining parties change significantly once bargaining has
started.”121 Because the RLA bars self-help during the contract
amendable period—at least “until the National Mediation
Board releases them and the cooling-off periods expire”—these
lengthy negotiations can delay use of labor’s most effective
strategies.122
114 Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat.
1703 (1984).
115 The authority to grant merger requests, for example, was given to the U.S.
Department of Transportation. Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act, § 3(e). This
department abandoned the practice of requiring LPPs as a condition for merger
acceptance. See Schoder, supra note 79, at 115.
116 Walls, supra note 97, at 856.
117 Id.
118 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-652, AIRLINE LABOR RELATIONS:




121 Andrew von Nordenflycht & Thomas A. Kochan, Labor Contract Negotiations
in the Airline Industry, 25 MONTHLY LABOR REV. (July 2003), available at https://
www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2003/07/art3full.pdf. [https://perma.cc/3B4P-HFXC].
122 Id. at 19.
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Despite the relatively bleak picture painted here, the entirety
of post-deregulation labor history is not fire and brimstone.
There were some silver linings, relatively speaking, for individ-
ual workers in the industry. For example, when workers were
displaced from the industry, they tended to fare about as well as
any other person suffering unemployment.123 Between 1984 and
1994, displaced airline workers experienced a decline in wages
in their new jobs but not significantly more than those in other
industries.124 There are some cases of wage gains as well, espe-
cially in recent years. For example, United Airlines agreed to
increase the pay of 30,000 union workers by 30% over the
course of five years in 2016.125 The pilot union had similar suc-
cess, gaining a 16% raise within a year and a 2% raise after an-
other year.126 The Teamsters and Delta Air Lines pilot union, on
the other hand, recently rejected offers of a 33% wage increase
over six and a half years and 20% raise over four years, respec-
tively.127 Since 2010, overall airline industry compensation has
grown by $24 billion.128 At least in recent years, union members
have fared well despite the pitfalls of deregulation.
Even in the years immediately after deregulation, unions were
still a powerful force, capable of significant harm to carriers and
the industry when their demands were not met.129 By focusing
on participation in the process of managing the carrier, many
unions were able to protect their members.130 For example, in
1985, the pilots for United Airlines blocked an attempt to ac-
123 See Card, supra note 89, at 3–4.
124 Id.
125 Chris Isidore, United Airlines and Union Agree to 30% Wage Hikes Over Five





128 Ted Reed, Is the Airline Industry the Last Place Where Labor Has Something to




129 “Contrary to trends in the rest of the economy, the propensity of airline
workers for unions seems remarkably robust.” Card, supra note 89, at 23.
130 “The unions’ goal, and strategy for survival, was participation . . . [U]nions
[sought] participation in major corporate investment decisions in order to pro-
tect the viability of their employers and their members’ jobs.” Stone, supra note
106, at 1490–91.
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quire Frontier Airlines.131 Granted, this move led to Frontier go-
ing bankrupt and over 520 ALPA pilots losing their jobs, but it
demonstrated labor’s ability to derail carrier efforts to grow the
bottom line at union expense.132 Between 1978 and 2003, un-
ions struck the airlines a reported sixteen times.133 Beyond that,
there were ten court-recognized work actions other than strikes,
including strategies like sickouts, slowdowns, work stoppages,
and overtime refusal.134 Unions were still active and, though per-
haps not as effective as before deregulation, were still able to
advocate for the workers they represented.
This is not a comprehensive history of labor unions in the
airline industry. Nor, for that matter, is it a conclusive list of the
impacts deregulation has had on labor relations in the United
States. It is, however, a brief overview that demonstrates the
competing interests, concerns, and priorities of air carriers and
unions, as well as the general trends since deregulation. One
important component yet to be addressed is what happens when
neither labor nor airlines win: bankruptcy.
E. BANKRUPTCY IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
While not an absolute rule, the regulatory era of aviation his-
tory was blessed with relative financial stability for air carriers.135
This was not the case after Congress passed the ADA. Between
1990 and 2011, 189 airlines filed for bankruptcy protection.136
Since then, several more airlines have utilized the Code in re-
sponse to financial distress, with the most recent137 being Hawaii
Island Air on October 17, 2017.138 In a competitive market,
there will always be winners and losers.139 While there are nu-
131 Kenneth Labich, America’s Most Arrogant Union, FORTUNE MAG. (Nov. 10,
1986), available at http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_arch
ive/1986/11/10/68255/index.htm [https://perma.cc/UW3Y-84NK].
132 Id.
133 GAO REPORT, supra note 118, at 42.
134 Id.
135 See supra Part I.A.
136 American Joins Long List of Airline Bankruptcies, BOSTON.COM (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://archive.boston.com/business/articles/2011/11/29/american_joins_long
_list_of_airline_bankruptcies/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
137 This is as of February 2, 2018.
138 Jon Hemmerdinger, Hawaiian Carrier Island Air to Cease Operations, FLIGHT
GLOBAL (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/hawaiian-
carrier-island-air-to-cease-operations-443109/ [https://perma.cc/HJ36-PPT4].
139 The term “survival of the fittest” has been used to argue that bankruptcy is a
sign of healthy competition in a market. For an argument that this principle is
not truly applicable in the airline industry, see Kristina McQuaid, Comment, Delta
2018] MAKE AIRLINES GREAT AGAIN 659
merous causes of the nearly 200 bankruptcy filings, there are
some distinct trends that can be identified.
The first major cause of these bankruptcies is the decline in
revenues after deregulation.140 The causes of declining reve-
nues, however, take many forms. Business travelers, previously
the staple customer for air carriers, have given way to leisure
travelers who are more price sensitive.141 With the CAB’s fare
regulation out of the way, new market entrants could, and ex-
isting carriers would have to, compete based on price.142 The
growing passenger capacity that accompanied capital and tech-
nology improvements143 has also pushed ticket prices down; air-
lines have an incentive to maximize their profit per flight, and
adding a discount-priced customer without incurring any incre-
mental cost is an effective strategy.144 This was especially chal-
lenging for existing carriers because new airlines “were
nonunion operations, not subject to union work rules or pay
scales” and thus could underbid for customers.145 Downward
pressures on revenue were immediately troublesome to airlines
after deregulation and continue to push carriers toward insol-
vency today.
Though the new revenue challenges of a competitive market
are not unique to airlines and may not be enough to break a
carrier on their own, airlines are also greatly exposed to fluctuat-
ing operating costs. More specifically, many airlines live and die
on the price of oil and fuel, which is generally the industry’s
second largest expense.146 Prior to deregulation, a rise in fuel
costs could be offset by the CAB adjusting fares industry-wide,
allowing carriers to maintain their profit margins without being
underbid by competitors.147 It is no surprise that airline profit-
& Northwest File for Bankruptcy: Is It Time to Ground A Major Airline?, 29 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 663, 689 (2007).
140 See supra Part I.D.
141 McQuaid, supra note 139, at 668.
142 Walls, supra note 97, at 853–54.
143 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
144 McQuaid, supra note 139, at 668.
145 Stone, supra note 106, at 1490.
146 “[F]uel is an airline’s second largest expense. Fuel makes up a significant
portion of an airline’s total costs, although efficiency among different carriers
can vary widely.” The Industry Handbook: The Airline Industry, supra note 41.
147 To get a sense of the volatility of oil prices and how difficult it is for airlines
to budget effectively, see Crude Oil Prices–70 Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS,
www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart [https://perma.cc/5QS
5-RHVA].
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ability often mirrors the unpredictable price of oil.148 Based on
2010 cost structures, analysts argue that the “break-even point,
beyond which airlines cannot make a profit, exists when the
world oil price is around US $80 per barrel.” After deregulation,
and continuing through today, highly volatile oil prices have
brought the airline industry to its knees and driven many carri-
ers into bankruptcy. For example, the bankruptcy of Braniff In-
ternational Airways149 has been largely blamed on a massive rise
in fuel costs.150
Despite the impact that fuel costs have on the industry, the
deciding factor in a carrier’s solvency is typically its labor costs.
By 2002, around the time of a smattering of airline bankrupt-
cies,151 “[l]abor’s share of total expenses reached a modern-day
high of 37%.”152 Trans World Airlines, for example, went bank-
rupt in 2001 largely due to a contract with the IAM that re-
quired them to keep unnecessary and expensive maintenance
facilities open.153 US Airways filed for bankruptcy in 2002.154
Though there were multiple causes, labor opposed the acquisi-
tion attempt by United Airlines in 2000 that could have kept the
148 This is illustrated effectively in the graph of the AMEX Airline Index and
the US Gulf Coast Kereosene-Type Jet Fuel Spot Price. See Adam Levine-Wein-
berg, Are Lower Oil Prices Already Hurting Airline Revenue?, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Dec.
10, 2014, 10:20 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/12/10/are-
lower-oil-prices-already-hurting-airline-reven.aspx [https://perma.cc/3FSG-
Q8J2].
149 For a comprehensive and entertaining review of Braniff’s financial woes,
see pressmin, Enterprise—Tailspin (Brainiff Airlines)—1983, YOUTUBE (Aug. 30,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2nw4evfi_pU [https://perma.cc/
RF9V-BG5J].
150 Though not the only cause, fuel prices derailed Braniff’s plans for expan-
sion and drove a net loss of $377 million between 1979 and 1982. Ron Scherer,
Why Braniff International’s Colorful Career Has Ended, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May
14, 1982), https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0514/051477.html (last visited
Aug. 26, 2018).
151 Trans World Airlines, US Airways, and United Airlines were some of the
major carriers driven into insolvency between 2001 and 2002.
152 This share of costs dropped to 25% in 2006, in large part due to the rise in
fuel costs. Barry Hirsch, Unions and Wages in the Airline Industry, INT’L AIR TRANSP.
ASS’N (July 2007), https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/
Hirsch_Unions_Wages.pdf [https://perma.cc/J76S-UTK7].
153 See Elaine X. Grant, TWA—Death Of A Legend, ST. LOUIS MAG. (July 28, 2006,
12:00 AM), https://www.stlmag.com/TWA-Death-Of-A-Legend/ [https://perma
.cc/87YF-R7JP].
154 US Airways Files for Bankruptcy, NBC (Aug. 13, 2004, 11:41 AM), www
.nbcnews.com/id/5982378/ns/business-us_business/#.Wn9TVUxFxXB [https:/
/perma.cc/P3QA-VZ3R].
2018] MAKE AIRLINES GREAT AGAIN 661
carrier afloat.155 United Airlines filed for Chapter 11 protection
in 2002 but was unable to emerge from bankruptcy without
eliminating pensions and reducing wages to save $2 billion.156
Even when labor costs are not the driving force behind insol-
vency, they can be an impediment to recovery. The September
11 attacks threw the industry into turmoil. In response, the Air
Transportation Stabilization Board gave America West a $379.6
million loan guarantee but “demanded severe limits on labor
costs.”157 The role that unions play in causing financial distress is
not merely increasing a carrier’s labor expense, though they do
that quite effectively158 and often with the support of various
levels of government.159 Union efforts to increase participation
in corporate decisions,160 such as mergers and acquisitions, can
also force carriers into bankruptcy.
Again, this discussion does not begin to cover all of the exam-
ples or causes of airline insolvencies. The intention is to demon-
strate how common bankruptcy has become and illustrate some
of the underlying issues that must be addressed when discussing
solutions. A better understanding of all the factors involved will
hopefully make analysis of the related laws more effective. In
turn, the proposed solutions will be more likely to create greater
financial stability in the airline industry.
155 Floyd Norris, The Markets: Market Place; Stalwart Investors in US Airways Stand




156 Timeline of United Airlines’ Bankruptcy, USA TODAY (Feb. 1, 2006, 7:32 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2006-02-01-united-timeline_x
.htm [https://perma.cc/9W5L-PZXC].
157 Sally B. Donnelly, Air Support, TIME (Nov. 24, 2003), http://content.time
.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1006304,00.html.
158 Philadelphia’s municipal airport recently conditioned their lease with sev-
eral airlines on a mandatory minimum wage of $12 per hour, following the
union-friendly examples set by San Francisco and Los Angeles. Lydia DePillis,




159 For an analysis on the legality of these types of conditions, see Klayton
Sweitzer Hiland, Case Note, War and (Labor) Peace: How LAX and the Ninth Circuit
Changed the Rules of Engagement for Airline Service Providers and Organized Labor, 83 J.
AIR L. & COM. 145 (2018).
160 See Stone, supra note 106.
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II. STATE OF THE LAW
A. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The stated purposes of the RLA are to prevent service disrup-
tion, ensure the right for labor to organize, and settle dis-
putes.161 To that end, the law establishes a series of bilateral
duties. Both carriers and their employees have a duty to “exert
every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements” and
to “settle all disputes” arising out of labor relations and negotia-
tions.162 Understanding the structure of this process is crucial to
analyzing its application in practice.
First, the RLA distinguishes between different types of dis-
putes and delegates resolution of those disputes to different au-
thoritative boards.163 “Representation disputes” over the identity
of a collective bargaining representative are addressed by the
National Mediation Board (NMB). The National Railroad Ad-
justment Board164 handles “minor disputes,”165 which are those
issues that “grow[ ] out of grievances or out of the interpreta-
tion or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions.”166 “Major disputes” involve establishing
or amending a collective bargaining agreement that addresses
“rates of pay, rules[,] and working conditions.”167 For the pur-
poses of understanding the role of collective bargaining, this
Comment will focus specifically on major dispute resolution
under the RLA.
Major dispute resolution is directed, at least initially, into ne-
gotiations between representatives for both the carrier and the
employees.168 These representatives are to be chosen without in-
terference by the other party and are selected through majority
vote based on craft or class.169 At any point in time during the
process, either party may refer any dispute to the NMB,170 which
161 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151a (2018).
162 Id. § 152.
163 Walls, supra note 97, at 858–59, n.62.
164 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, 184.
165 See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722 (1945), adhered to on
reh’g, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
166 Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 655 F.2d
155, 158 (8th Cir. 1981).
167 Walls, supra note 97, at n.62.
168 Burley, 325 U.S. at 722.
169 Any disputes as to who the representatives are for a class are decided by the
National Mediation Board. Id.
170 45 U.S.C. § 154 (2018).
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in turn will provide mediatory services and hopefully reach a
settlement.171 Should that fail, the NMB must encourage, but
may not mandate, that the parties submit the dispute to arbitra-
tion.172 If that is refused, the NMB declares a thirty-day “cooling
off”173 period, during which the parties can either settle or
choose to attend arbitration; the status quo of the parties in
terms of pay, rules, working conditions or established practices
must otherwise be maintained.174 Alternatively, the RLA allows
the NMB to notify the President of the United States if the dis-
pute cannot be settled and “threaten[s] substantially to inter-
rupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any
section of the country of essential transportation service.”175 The
President may in turn create an emergency board (PEB) for the
purposes of investigating and reporting on the situation.176 Rec-
ommendations from the PEB are not binding, and a subsequent
thirty-day cooling-off period marks the end of the dispute reso-
lution process outlined in the RLA.177
Built into this process are periods of time in which notice has
to be given, conferences have to be scheduled, and mandatory
cooling-off periods during which self-help is prohibited.178 By
statutorily elongating the process, especially with mandatory
cooling-off periods, the RLA puts particularly intense pressure
on carriers that are struggling financially. Often times, lenders
will refuse credit to carriers who are unable to guarantee cuts to
labor costs.179 As discussed previously, the average length of ne-
gotiations has risen significantly over the last several decades.180
To illustrate the impact of even a week’s delay in obtaining re-
lief, consider the example of American Airlines. In 2010, a year
171 Id. § 155.
172 Id.
173 Mark C. Stephens, Comment, Losing Lift and Creating Drag! The Effect of Na-
tional Mediation Board Execution and Railway Labor Act Court Decisions on the Collec-
tive Bargaining Process in the Airline Industry: A Union Perspective, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REV. 141, 144 (2008).
174 45 U.S.C. § 155.
175 Id. § 160.
176 Id.
177 Stephens, supra note 173, at 144–45; von Nordenflycht & Kochan, supra
note 121.
178 See 45 U.S.C. §§ 155–160 (2018); von Nordenflycht & Kochan, supra note
121.
179 Generous as it is with corporate welfare and subsidies, even the U.S. federal
government has been known to require labor cuts before aiding a struggling air-
line. Donnelly, supra note 157.
180 See supra Part I.D; GAO REPORT, supra note 118, at 10.
664 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [83
before filing for bankruptcy, American Airlines paid out
$6,227,000,000 in wages, salaries, and benefits.181 This equates
to $119,750,000 per week just to cover payroll expenses. In just
the last two years, three major airlines agreed to a $3.3 billion
increase in labor-related operating costs.182 For carriers desper-
ately in need of payroll credit or short term capital infusions,
having to wade through a long process to get any possible con-
cessions on an amendable contract can be enough to sink
them.183
All of this is not to say that unions deliberately prolong negoti-
ations in an attempt to induce bankruptcy. Quite the opposite:
there are many examples of labor willingly taking pay and bene-
fits cuts in an attempt to keep an airline afloat.184 However,
when a contract is not yet amendable or a union is unwilling to
make the concessions necessary for an airline to remain profita-
ble, there is only one remaining option for the carrier:
bankruptcy.
B. THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY CODE
The Code185 was enacted in 1978 and amended in 1984 in an
“attempt to conform the bankruptcy laws to prevailing business
realities.”186 Since then, the law has been amended numerous
times, often to address additional business realities as they de-
velop. The Code has many important components, but Chapter
11 reorganization will be the focus of this discussion. This por-
tion of the Comment will provide a brief look at specific code
181 AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 40 (Feb. 16, 2011),
available at https://www.last10k.com/sec-filings/aal/0000950123-11-014740.htm#
[https://perma.cc/Q63K-PPVN].
182 Justin Bachman, Higher Fuel and Labor Costs Mean You’ll Pay More to Fly in
2017, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-01-05/higher-fuel-and-labor-costs-mean-you-ll-pay-more-to-fly-in-
2017.
183 Braniff’s CEO described the challenge the airline faced, as struggling car-
rier, coming up with enough cash to make payroll every two weeks. See pressmin,
supra note 149 and accompanying video.
184 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airline Bankruptcy: The Post-Deregulation Epidemic,
MCGILL UNIV. INST. OF AIR & SPACE L. 47 (2012), https://www.mcgill.ca/iasl/
files/iasl/aspl613_paul_dempsey_airlinebankruptcies2012.pdf [https://perma
.cc/D45P-842G].
185 Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
186 Jeffrey S. Heuer & Musette H. Vogel, Airlines in the Wake of Deregulation:
Bankruptcy As an Alternative to Economic Deregulation, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 247, 257
(1991).
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provisions, how the law has changed, and an example of the
Code’s use in practice.
Chapter 11 of the Code has several purposes. First, it protects
debtors by automatically staying most debt collection activi-
ties.187 Second, it provides debtors an opportunity to reorganize
their debt and capital structure with the goal of returning a sol-
vent business to the marketplace.188 Third, it intends to find eq-
uitable outcomes for creditors, stockholders, and the public at
large.189 Most importantly, at least for the purposes of this Com-
ment, it allows debtors a way out of contracts, like collective bar-
gaining agreements, while minimizing the impact on the
debtor’s employees.190 Chapter 11 often allows a “debtor in pos-
session”191 to retain control over the company while moving
through the bankruptcy process and gives the debtor in posses-
sion powers similar to those of a bankruptcy trustee.192 This
means that the management of the company often remains in
place during the reorganization process.193
Once an airline files for bankruptcy, it may face a good faith
challenge;194 when the high cost of labor is the driving force
behind the bankruptcy, a union challenge is especially likely. An
early example of this type of challenge is the Continental Air-
lines bankruptcy.195 Three separate unions filed a motion to dis-
miss the bankruptcy proceedings, claiming that Continental was
abusing the Code to reject the existing collective bargaining
agreements.196 The court found that “[n]either the sole nor pri-
mary purpose of the filing was to reject these executory con-
187 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 2018).
188 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 186, at 257–58.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (2018).
192 Id. § 1107.
Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this
chapter, and to such limitations or conditions as the court
prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights, other
than the right to compensation under Section 330 of this title, and
powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties, except the
duties specified in Sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4) of this title, of
a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.
193 Debtors in possession can be challenged by a “party in interest” in an ap-
pearance before the bankruptcy court if there is a question as to their fitness to
continue operating the company. Id. § 1107.
194 Id. § 1129(a)(3).
195 In re Cont’l Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. 67, 71–72 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984).
196 Id. at 71.
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tracts[,] although it is clear that at filing Continental Airlines
expected to be able to do this under the provisions of that
law.”197 The motion to dismiss the bankruptcy proceedings was
denied.198 This case illustrates an important, and seemingly
valid, concern that many unions have about air carriers filing for
bankruptcy: are the carriers just using the Code to circumvent
the RLA and avoid making good on their collective bargaining
agreements?
In the Continental Airlines bankruptcy, the carrier intended
to rely on Section 365 of the Code199 to reject the collective bar-
gaining agreements as executory contracts.200 Unions, in cases
like these, often tried to argue that Section 1167201 prevented
the rejection of collective bargaining agreements but were un-
successful for a variety of reasons.202 The Supreme Court eventu-
ally addressed the tension between the Code and the RLA in the
1984 case of National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco &
Bildisco,203 in large part due to “[t]he rising number of bank-
ruptcies that was the consequence of the early 80s reces-
sion[.]”204 The Court found that, despite the Board’s rules,
bankruptcy courts “should permit a debtor in possession to re-
ject a collective[ ]bargaining agreement upon a showing that
the agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scru-
tiny, the equities balance in favor of rejecting the labor con-
tract.”205 Additionally, the Court found that “a debtor in
possession does not commit an unfair labor practice when, after
the filing of a bankruptcy petition but before court-approved re-
197 Id. at 71–72.
198 Id. at 72.
199 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2018).
200 In re Cont’l Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. at 72.
201 “Notwithstanding section 365 of this title, neither the court nor the trustee
may change the wages or working conditions of employees of the debtor estab-
lished by a collective bargaining agreement that is subject to the Railway Labor
Act except in accordance with section 6 of such Act.” 11 U.S.C. § 1167.
202 Papaioannou, supra note 1, at 224 (internal citations omitted).
One court gave emphasis to the fact that section 1167 appears in
Subchapter IV of Chapter 11 which explicitly states that it covers
only railroad employees. Another court relied on the past history of
section 1167 which derives from Section 77(n) of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. The latter provided that “No judge or trustee acting
under this Title shall change the wages or working conditions of
railroad employees except in the manner prescribed in sections
151 to 163 of R.L.A.”
203 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
204 Papaioannou, supra note 1, at 228.
205 Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 465 U.S. at 535 (internal quotations omitted).
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jection of the collective[ ]bargaining agreement, it unilaterally
modifies or terminates one or more provisions of the
agreement.”206
The result of this case was obviously not well received by the
unions, who saw the result as a threat to their future bargaining
positions as well as carriers’ willingness to “sacrifice policies en-
hanced by labor law adjudication for the survival needs of the
company.”207 In response to extensive union lobbying efforts, an
amendment was made to the Code in 1984.208 Section 1113 of
the Code now allows for rejection of collective bargaining agree-
ments under the RLA only after following a set procedure.209
After filing a Chapter 11 petition, the debtor in possession or
trustee must:
make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employ-
ees covered by such agreement, based on the most complete and
reliable information available at the time of such proposal, which
provides for those necessary modification in the employees bene-
fits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of
the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the
affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.210
This proposal must be accompanied with all “relevant infor-
mation as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.”211 The parties
must then negotiate in good faith in an attempt to reach an
agreement.212 Absent such settlement, the court may only ap-
prove the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement if it
finds that the union has refused to accept the carrier’s proposal
without good cause and the “balance of the equities213 clearly
206 Id. at 516–17.
207 Papaioannou, supra note 1, at 232.
208 Id. at 233.
209 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2018).
210 Id. (emphasis added).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 The following is a non-exclusive list of equities to consider:
(1) the likelihood and consequences of liquidation if rejection is
not permitted; (2) the likely reduction in the value of creditors’
claims if the bargaining agreement remains in force; (3) the likeli-
hood and consequences of a strike if the bargaining agreement is
voided; (4) the possibility and likely effect of any employee claims
for breach of contract if rejection is approved; (5) the cost-spread-
ing abilities of the various parties, taking into account the number
of employees covered by the bargaining agreement and how vari-
ous employees’ wages and benefits compare to those of others in
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favors rejection of such agreement.”214 The court must make
this ruling within thirty days of the hearing.
Another important part of this amendment is the possibility
for the court to authorize the trustee to “implement interim
changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules
provided by a collective bargaining agreement.”215 This is only
allowed if it is essential to the debtor’s business or to avoid irrep-
arable damage to the estate. Crucially, this component of the
amendment is an acknowledgement that a labor contract can
often sink a company into insolvency and prevent its
reemergence as a viable business. Likewise, it recognizes that im-
mediate changes may be necessary to prevent full collapse. As
discussed previously, and as will be discussed in more detail be-
low, the lengthy negotiation process under the RLA and the dif-
ficult process of reorganization, without immediate relief, can
spell the end of an airline.216
The American Airlines (AMR) bankruptcy in 2011 provides
an effective example. AMR filed for bankruptcy in 2011 after
losing $1 billion that year and over $10 billion since 2001.217
AMR negotiated with its unions and came to amicable settle-
ments with all parties except the pilots union, the Allied Pilots
Association (APA).218 After a three-week trial and ongoing nego-
tiations, AMR was forced to file a motion under Section 1113 to
reject the collective bargaining agreement because the pro-
posed modifications were not accepted by the APA.219 The court
found the APA’s rejection of the modifications to be without
“good cause,” denying APA arguments that AMR must merge
with another airline.220 It also found that the proposed reorgani-
zation plan was not fatally flawed despite being remarkably simi-
lar to AMR’s prior business plans.221 Most important, for the
purposes of this Comment, is the court’s acknowledgment that
the only two “significant additions from American’s prior ‘Cor-
the industry; and (6) the good or bad faith of the parties in dealing
with the debtor’s financial dilemma.
In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 448 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
214 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c).
215 Id. § 1113(e).
216 See supra Part II.A.
217 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 394.
218 Id. at 393.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 415.
221 Id. at 416.
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nerstone Strategy’”222 were “the purchase of new aircraft and the
labor savings proposed in this Section 1113 proceeding.”223 The court
agreed with AMR that, despite the APA’s contention that labor
costs were converging towards industry standards, it was neces-
sary to reject the existing collective bargaining agreement and
make changes to pay and benefits.224
As discussed above, one of the stated purposes of the Code is
to “conform the bankruptcy laws to prevailing business reali-
ties.”225 One of those realities, as the court noted in the AMR
case, is “that the airline industry labor contract negotiation pro-
cess is inherently uncertain and the results of labor contract ne-
gotiations are difficult to predict.”226 Another of those realities is
that the RLA collective bargaining and dispute resolution
processes are lengthy and expensive, which can make it harder
to obtain the necessary profitability or financing to stave off a
bankruptcy filing.227
III. IS THIS THE BEST WE CAN DO?
Using the Code to reject burdensome collective bargaining
agreements has become a common practice in the industry.
Even when airlines do not file the bankruptcy petition, the
threat of a bankruptcy filing, and the collateral consequences to
unions, is a common issue in labor negotiations.228 Critical anal-
ysis of the Section 1113 process leads to the following questions:
(1) Is this process effective for promoting financially viable air
carriers?; (2) Is there a better, entirely alternative solution to the
conflict between labor interests and carrier solvency?; and (3) If
the current process is effective, can the principles behind the
process be extended to better facilitate financial stability in the
industry?
222 The “Cornerstone Strategy” was a focus on AMR’s major flight hubs. Id. at
418.
223 Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
224 Id. at 423.
225 Heuer & Vogel, supra note 186, at 257.
226 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. at 423 (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
227 Lenders often condition capital infusions on cuts to labor costs, which are
often difficult to guarantee during collective bargaining and dispute resolution.
See Donnelly, supra note 157.
228 Union concessions started with financially troubled carriers “to try to stave
off bankruptcy” but spread to solvent carriers. Stone, supra note 106, at 1543.
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A. IS THIS PROCESS EFFECTIVE?
When evaluating the effectiveness of the Section 1113 proce-
dure, it is important to keep in mind that for the process to
begin, the carrier must be in such financial distress that bank-
ruptcy protections become necessary. Once a petition is filed, in
order to reorganize under Chapter 11, the airline must be able
to make a good faith claim for the necessity of its proposed busi-
ness plan.229 Even with the benefits of debt restructuring and
rejection of collective bargaining agreements, a bankruptcy peti-
tion is not always successful.
For example, many airlines that enter Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion soon cease operations. Frontier Airlines, Eastern Airlines,
Pan American World Airways, American Trans Air, and Skybus
Airlines are just some of the major airlines that were forced to
cease operations after filing for bankruptcy.230 Several other air-
lines have been repeat bankruptcy customers, such as US Air-
ways and Sun Country Airlines.231 In other cases, carriers are
only able to reemerge as fiscally viable entities through merger
or acquisition transactions.
There are, however, major success stories stemming from
Chapter 11 reorganizations. Northwest Airlines was able to abro-
gate its agreement with a flight attendants union, among others,
without incurring damages liability for a breach.232 Through this
process, Northwest was able to cut labor costs by about $1.4 bil-
lion per year.233 Perhaps the best example is American Airlines.
After acquiring the bankrupt Trans World Airlines in early 2001,
significant debt, an excess of employees, and the September 11
terrorist attacks pushed American Airlines into Chapter 11
before the end of the year.234 After successfully rejecting the col-
lective bargaining agreement with the pilots and amicably modi-
229 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2018).
230 U.S. Bankruptcies and Service Cessations, AIRLINES FOR AM., https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20160528074046/http://airlines.org/data/u-s-bankruptcies-and-ser
vices-cessations/ [https://perma.cc/N9RX-ZVZC].
231 US Airways Files for Bankruptcy, supra note 154; David Phelps, Cambria Deal
Gives New Life to Sun Country, STAR TRIBUNE (July 21, 2011, 12:39 AM), www.star-
tribune.com/cambria-deal-new-life-to-sun-country/125906638/ [https://perma
.cc/8N5Y-4U88].
232 In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 366 B.R. 270, 275 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
233 Martin Moylan, Northwest Airlines Projects It’ll be Worth $7B Post-Bankruptcy,
MPR NEWS (Feb 15, 2007), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2007/02/15/nwa
plan [https://perma.cc/N25N-VQF7].
234 Ally Schmidt, American Airlines Overview: The Past, the Crisis, and the Recovery,
MARKET REALIST (July 15, 2016, 12:40 PM), https://marketrealist.com/2016/06/
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fying agreements with other unions,235 American Airlines
merged with US Airways.236 Since then, AMR stock has gone
from $25.25 per share on October 1, 2013, to $48.36 per share
on February 9, 2018.237 Looking to American Airlines as an ex-
ample, it is clear that rejecting a collective bargaining agree-
ment through the bankruptcy process can be a major catalyst for
future success and financial viability.
Though not the primary concern here, the process for re-
jecting an agreement through Section 1113 is not an inequitable
one with respect to labor unions. Given the choice between a
bankrupt airline that is forced to cease operations, resulting in
100% unemployment, and the necessary238 alterations to be-
come financially viable, the choice for unions is clear. Moreover,
the blow to union wages and benefits is often softened by em-
ployee participation in corporate profit sharing. For example,
Northwest employees were able to garner about $1.5 billion
through a profit sharing deal with the airline.239
The Section 1113 process is obviously effective, at least to
serve its intended purpose. It allows the carrier to obtain the
relief necessary to gain solvency. It protects the interests of em-
ployees by allowing as many workers as is feasible to keep their
jobs, albeit at lower rates of pay. The system works and clearly
provides an important benefit to the industry, but it is not neces-
sarily the best possible solution.
B. IS THERE A SUPERIOR ALTERNATIVE?
One suggested alternative to the Section 1113 process for re-
jecting a collective bargaining agreement is a legislative rewrite
to require mandatory alternative dispute resolution to modify or
american-airline-group-look-evolution-company [https://perma.cc/X4V2-XGL
4].
235 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 393 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
236 The merger was challenged by other airlines and the Department of Justice.
For more details, see Bart Jansen, Justice Department Challenges American-US Airways
Merger, USA TODAY (Aug. 13, 2013, 10:51 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
travel/news/2013/08/13/justice-american-us-airways/2647545/ [https://perma
.cc/VA9W-QWVJ].
237 American Airlines Group Inc., MARKET WATCH, https://www.marketwatch
.com/investing/stock/aal/charts (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
238 Rejection of the collective bargaining agreement can only occur if the pro-
posed modifications are necessary to the carrier’s viability. 11 U.S.C. § 1113
(2018).
239 Moylan, supra note 233.
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reject an agreement.240 The article proposing this rewrite would
have Section 1113 read: “The debtor in possession, or the trus-
tee if one has been appointed, may only reject or alter a collec-
tive bargaining agreement if the parties mutually agree to these
terms through negotiation, mediation, or any other alternative
dispute resolution forum that the parties mutually agree
upon.”241 The theory behind this proposal is that Section 1113,
as it currently stands, “takes away the union’s voice and allows
the court to impose management’s terms on a collective bar-
gaining agreement. By amending [Section] 1113 to require co-
operation, it restores the power balance between unions and
management.”242 Carriers would, in turn, be “saved from liqui-
dation or a forced merger[,] and thousands of pilots and flight
attendants [would be] able to keep their jobs—albeit with some
sacrifices.”243
While this theoretical legislative fix may have some ethical,
moral, or equitable appeal to those with overly union-sympa-
thetic tendencies, the reasoning and assumptions that under-
write its proposal do not stand up to scrutiny for a variety of
reasons. First and foremost, there is an assumption in this pro-
posal that carriers and unions have not already gone through an
extensive negotiation, mediation, or arbitration process. How-
ever, the RLA already requires that any collective bargaining
agreement, upon its creation and through its amendment, go
through an extensive and time-consuming process of negotia-
tion and mediation.244 Assuming that the carrier was unable to
garner the necessary concessions to avoid or otherwise emerge
from bankruptcy through the RLA process, it is highly unlikely
that re-mediating the same issue, with the same parties and the
same stakes, will result in sufficient labor cost reductions to keep
the airline running. It is worth noting again that under the cur-
rent Section 1113 process, carriers must meet with unions to ne-
gotiate the proposed alterations to their agreements outside of
the judicially sanctioned rejection process.245 If both parties
240 Max Schatzow, An Alternative Universe to § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code: The
Mediation Between American Airlines and Its Workforce, 10 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 1
(2013).
241 Id. at 5.
242 Id. at 19.
243 Id. at 20.
244 45 U.S.C. §§ 154, 155 (2018).
245 “[T]he trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized repre-
sentative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory
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knew that the carrier was in distress when negotiating amend-
ments to the collective bargaining agreement, it is nonsensical
to believe that a legislatively-forced second round of negotia-
tions or mediation would yield a different result.
The next flaw in the reasoning behind this proposition is be-
lieving that a moderated, less management-friendly result is
preferable to a judicially-sanctioned rejection through the cur-
rent Section 1113. Rejecting a collective bargaining agreement
is only possible when it is necessary for the carrier to stay in busi-
ness.246 Presumably, the proposed mediation alternative would
result in fewer labor concessions and therefore inherently fall
short of the necessary cost reductions to successfully reorganize
under Chapter 11. This proposed alteration to Section 1113
would, at a minimum, risk mediating a carrier into reorganiza-
tion failure, and at the maximum, guarantee continued
insolvency.
Another serious flaw with the proposed legislative fix is the
potential for even longer, more drawn out reorganization
processes. As discussed previously, lengthier negotiations mean
maintaining the untenable status quo agreement for an unac-
ceptably long time.247 Lenders, investors, and possible merger or
acquisition partners will likely avoid stepping in until they know
what labor cost reductions they can expect.248 The relative un-
certainty of the proposed mediation process, as compared to the
guarantee of necessary concessions through the judicial rejec-
tion process, will also make financing the reorganization more
difficult and force any carriers emerging from bankruptcy to
carry a more burdensome debt and interest expense. This is
contrary to the purpose and principles of the Bankruptcy
Code.249
modifications of such agreement.” 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (2018) (emphasis ad-
ded); see In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 393 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
246 “[W]hich provides for those necessary modifications in the employees bene-
fits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor
. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
247 See supra Part II.A.
248 See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basics,
UNITED STATES COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankrupt
cy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/SMV6-MCEK]; Don-
nelly, supra note 157.
249 “Chapter 11 has multiple purposes[, one of which is] . . . to return the
debtor to the marketplace as a viable enterprise.” Heuer & Vogel, supra note 186,
at 257.
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Finally, this proposed solution does not adequately address
the diverging interests of the individuals and parties involved in
a potential mediation.250 Union representatives are incentivized
to minimize concessions, to prioritize the union over the com-
pany, and to return both fiscal and moral victories to their mem-
bers.251 Often times, even amongst unions themselves, interests
diverge as each union’s representative attempts to push the nec-
essary concessions onto another class of workers.252 Were union
representatives to behave otherwise, they would risk their re-
placement, both individually as the negotiator and the union
itself as the certified bargaining representative. Carriers, of
course, would enter mediation with the intention of reducing
labor costs to a sustainable and solvent level. With these diverg-
ing interests, it is hard to see any way, beyond negotiators abro-
gating their client’s interests, that mediation could produce the
necessary results to return a carrier to solvency.253
Mandatory mediation, as an exclusive replacement to the judi-
cially-sanctioned rejection in Section 1113, is not a viable alter-
native for carriers attempting to reorganize under Chapter 11.
IV. A RADICAL SOLUTION
A. CAN WE AVOID BANKRUPTCY?
Just because the current Section 1113 process is effective and
generally results in more financially stable and solvent air carri-
ers emerging from bankruptcy does not mean that the process is
perfect. The most glaring flaw in the process is its own existence:
the law requires a carrier to declare bankruptcy and seek Chap-
ter 11 reorganization before it can make the necessary changes
to its labor contracts. While utilizing the Code to reject agree-
ments and reduce labor costs has become a popular strategy
since deregulation, it has been primarily out of necessity rather
than preference.254 The law creates a metaphoric scenario
where a person hanging from the edge of a cliff is not assisted
250 The article proposing this solution does discuss, in passing, the different
ways that interests are displayed publicly and privately but does not address the
fundamental divergence of the interests. See Schatzow, supra note 240, at 15–16.
251 Id.
252 Id.; The Beginning, supra note 82.
253 This is, in fact, the outcome of the hypothetical mediation scenario pro-
posed as an alternative to the current Section 1113. See Schatzow, supra note 240,
at 15–16.
254 In fact, carriers try desperately to avoid having to enter bankruptcy. See
pressmin, supra note 149 and accompanying video.
2018] MAKE AIRLINES GREAT AGAIN 675
until only a single finger on a single hand is left holding the
person from certain death. Meanwhile, those capable of ensur-
ing the person’s survival stand by and watch, withholding assis-
tance until the very last moment.
This Comment proposes, as opposed to both Section 1113
and the mandatory mediation alternative discussed above,255
that the RLA be amended to allow for unilateral rejection of
collective bargaining agreements outside the bankruptcy pro-
cess. The proposed amendment may read:
Notwithstanding sections 155 and 156, a carrier may unilaterally
reject the terms relating to rates of pay, rules, and working condi-
tions of a collective bargaining agreement upon a showing to the
court, the National Mediation Board, or the duly appointed arbi-
tration board that: (1) The carrier is in a state of financial dis-
tress such that insolvency is reasonably likely, (2) The terms
sought to be rejected are a substantial cause of the financial dis-
tress, (3) The management has made a proposal to the author-
ized representative of the employees covered by such agreement,
based on the most complete and reliable information available at
the time of such proposal, which is reasonably tailored to allevi-
ate the risk of insolvency, and (4) the authorized representative
of the employees has refused to accept such proposal without
good cause.
The proposal made here is a radical departure from both legis-
lative and judicial precedent but is one that recognizes and ac-
commodates the realities of the airline industry.
It is an unquestionable truth that bankruptcy has conse-
quences. It is a long and demoralizing process, it destroys credit
ratings, and it sends negative signals to investors.256 When a ma-
jor player goes bankrupt, it often impacts the financial stability
of the entire industry.257 Assuming that bankruptcy is something
that carriers, unions, and the industry as a whole want to avoid,
it makes sense to provide an avenue for carriers to re-establish
255 See supra Part III.B.
256 When the risk of bankruptcy increases, investors sell off stock rapidly to
minimize losses. See Simone Foxman, CHART OF THE DAY: American Airlines Has
Taken a Big Round-Trip Flight, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 29, 2011, 9:25 AM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-american-airliness-big-round-trip-flight-
2011-11 [https://perma.cc/GK37-MBUX].
257 The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, followed by the investment banking col-
lapse of 2007–2008, is but one example. See Nick Mathiason, Three Weeks that
Changed the World, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 27, 2008, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguar-
dian.com/business/2008/dec/28/markets-credit-crunch-banking-2008 [https://
perma.cc/K9SA-MX8H].
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manageable labor costs without being driven into bankruptcy by
them.
This proposal may seem detrimental to the balance of power
in the carrier-labor relationship established by the RLA. How-
ever, this proposal does not allow for any unique advantages not
already available to the carriers under Section 1113. The carrier
must still show that they are in financial distress and that bur-
densome labor agreements are a substantial cause of that dis-
tress. The carrier must still propose an alteration to the unions,
and that proposal must be rejected without good cause. The pri-
mary difference is that, under Section 1113, the carrier must al-
ready be bankrupt, making the dispute about whether rejecting
the agreement is necessary to emerge from bankruptcy. Under
this proposed amendment, the carrier must be in financial dis-
tress and near insolvency, and the dispute is whether rejecting
the agreement will allow the carrier to avoid the need for bank-
ruptcy protections. As the largest controllable cost to an airline,
labor costs will inevitably have to be reduced when times are
tough. It is preferable, for all parties, to ensure that happens
before bankruptcy takes place.
This amendment would also foster financial stability in the
overall industry. If investors and lenders know that struggling
airlines will have a last opportunity before incurring the costs of
bankruptcy, they will be more likely to provide capital infusions
to the carrier. This solution is especially appealing to unsecured
creditors, who would be far down on the list of asset recipients
should the carrier go bankrupt and be liquidated. In the case of
American Airlines, the primary changes that allowed for reor-
ganization and a merger with US Airways were the rejection and
restructuring of collective bargaining agreements.258 If the
merger was beneficial to both US Airways and American Air-
lines, there is no reason why American Airlines should have had
to enter bankruptcy to get the labor concessions necessary to
make the merger viable.259 Alternatively, if an acquisition is un-
desirable to either the carrier or the union, the opportunity for
a carrier to regain its footing by reducing labor costs outside of
the bankruptcy process may be enough to stave off a hostile
takeover.
Moreover, this proposal is consistent with judicial precedent
that directors of a corporation acting in the “zone of insol-
258 In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 416 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
259 See generally id.
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vency”260 continue to owe fiduciary duties “to the entity they
serve and to the shareholders of such entity,” whereas “creditors
become the principal constituency” upon a corporation’s bank-
ruptcy.261 Because directors owe the fiduciary duty of loyalty to
the carrier and its stockholders, they have an obligation to take
every action possible to ensure that the carrier remains profita-
ble for the benefit of those parties.262 This proposed amend-
ment would allow one final alternative to relinquishing the
carrier and its owners to the benefits of creditors.
It is highly likely that this proposal will not be received well by
those who are ideologically aligned with union interests. That is
of little concern, however, because at the point where high labor
costs have pushed a carrier to the brink of bankruptcy, there is
nothing that would be well-received by unions. The purpose of
this amendment would not be to make any one party happy but
rather to deal with the inevitability of bankruptcy without having
to incur the fiscal, managerial, and market-signaling costs. Un-
ions have historically, on occasion, been willing to accept con-
cessions when necessary to keep an airline functioning.263 This
amendment merely ensures the same outcome without relying
on the union’s willingness to sacrifice.
V. CONCLUSION
The airline industry grew dependent on government regula-
tion to ensure profitability until it was deregulated in 1978. Prior
to deregulation, labor was able to make substantial gains under
the RLA because cost controls were not a priority. Since deregu-
lation, however, the industry has been volatile and plagued with
bankruptcies. As a response, the Code was amended to create a
260 Barbara R. Parlin, The Zone of Insolvency: A Trap for the Unwary, HOLLAND &
KNIGHT (Mar. 14, 2008), https://www.hklaw.com/publications/The-Zone-Of-In-
solvency-A-Trap-for-the-Unwary-03-14-2008/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
While there are no precise definitions as to when a solvent com-
pany enters the zone of insolvency, fiduciaries should assume they
are operating in the zone of insolvency if the failure of a proposed
transaction is reasonably likely to cause a company to become insol-
vent, or if it is reasonably foreseeable that the corporation will have
ongoing trouble paying its creditors as a class.
261 Id.
262 “When a corporation is insolvent, however, its creditors take the place of
the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of any increase in value.” N. Am.
Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del.
2007).
263 See Dempsey, supra note 184, at 47.
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process for unilaterally rejecting a collective bargaining agree-
ment when it is necessary for successful reorganization. One
proposed amendment to the Code suggested mandatory media-
tion as a replacement for the agreement rejection provision.
That suggestion, however, is unrealistic and provides no benefit
beyond the current RLA process. The reduction of labor costs
for financially distressed carriers is a necessity, and the current
bankruptcy rejection process is effective for that purpose.
The proposal of this Comment, which is essentially an exten-
sion of the Code’s principles to amend RLA provisions, would
allow for the agreement rejection process to take place outside
of the bankruptcy court system. It would address the inevitability
and necessity of labor cost reductions without incurring the
harms of filing for bankruptcy. In that way, the RLA can pro-
mote more financial stability in the industry and address the re-
alities of a volatile and fragile American airline industry.
